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I. INTRODUCTION
One in three females' and one in seven males are sexually vic-
timized as children.2 Reports of child sex abuse have increased
throughout the 1980's, exceeding 113,000 cases in 1985. 3 More
shocking, two out of three cases of child sex abuse go unreported.4
Statistics reflect that successful prosecution is rare in cases in-
volving a sexual assault.5 This adds to an already disheartening prob-
lem. Heavy reliance by prosecutors on the testimony of the child
reflects one reason for this low number of successfully prosecuted
1. American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Fair Treatment of Child Witnesses in Cases
Where Child Abuse is Alleged 7 (1985).
2. Wolfe, Sas & Wilson, Some Issues in Preparing Sexually Abused Children for Courtroom
Testimony, 10 The Behavior Therapist 107 (1987).
3. Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of Pretrial
Interviews, 62 WASH. L. Ray. 705, n.1 (1987).
4. See D. Finkelhor, Sexually Victimized Children 53 (1979) (citing survey results).
5. See Note, Sexually Abused Children: The Best Kept Legal Secret, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HuM.
Rrs. ANN. 441, 446 (1986) (it is estimated that only 24% of all cases nationwide result in criminal
actions) (footnote omitted).
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cases.6 Often children are incompetent to testify or easily confused
during cross-examination. 7 As a result, the child is often unable to
recall crucial details8 or unable to relate those details to the jury.9
Numerous commentators believe the courtroom experience is
stressful for any witness, particularly for children unaccustomed to
legal proceedings.10 Some commentators have noted that the court-
room experience inflicts as much of a psychological crisis as the
rape itself;11 this further lessens the child's ability to testify. The
child not only suffers the painful mental and physical consequences
of the abuse itself, but must also face a possibile devastating emo-
tional court proceeding. Consequently, testifying becomes extremely
stressful, as well as confusing for a child. As a result, the child's
credibility is substantially weakened.
In recognition of the victimized child's situation, state legislatures
have enacted legislation to strengthen the prosecutor's hand while
easing the burden that the judicial system places on the testifying
6. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
7. At the trial of Robert and Lois Bentz, accused of participating with 22 other adults and
one teenager in two child sex abuse rings in Jordan, Minnesota, "the defense team relied on traditional
courtroom tactics to shake the children's stories and weaken their credibility with the jury. They
badgered them in an effort to confuse them about dates and places. They accused them of lying and
leaped onto the least inconsistency." The Bentz's were acquitted on all counts. N.Y. Times, Sept.
23, 1984, at A8, col. 1. All charges against other defendants were subsequently dropped. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1984, at A18, col. 1.
8. See A. Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony 203-05 (1979) (arguing that chil-
dren possess inferior long-term and short-term memories). Memory is an important factor given the
span of time seperating the alleged abusive incident from the trial. See also Stevens & Berliner, Special
Techniques For Child Witnesses, In The Sexual Victimology Of Youth 246, 248 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
But see Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAw & HtUM. BEHAv., 73, 76-77 91981) (citing
studies showing that children remember specific facts as well as adults do).
9. "A four-year-old doesn't know dates. You're lucky if you can get 'around christmas' or
'around my birthday.' Ten 'I don't knows' or 'I don't remembers' in a row make the child sound
as though he or she doesn't know what he's talking about." N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at A8, col.
I (quoting Linda Fairstein, chief of the sex crimes prosecution unit of the New York County District
Attorney's office).
10. See, e.g., Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law,
40 U. MLA L. REv. 181, 203 (1985).
11. Frumkin, The First Amendment and Mandatory Courtroom Closure in Globel Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court: The Press' Right, the Child Rape Victim's Plight, 11 HAsT. CONST. L. Q.
637 (1984); see also Note, Protecting Child Rape Victims from the Public and Press After Globel
Newspaper and Cox Broadcasting, 51 GEo. WAsH. L. Rlv. 269 (1983) (testimony required and publicity
generated expose victims to embarrassment and degradation).
[Vol. 931062
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child.1 2 However, legislatures must keep in mind that political pas-
sion often clouds reality. As the offensiveness of the crime increases,
so too does prosecutorial zeal and the need to guard against wrong-
ful prosecutions. 3 While protecting a child's emotional well-being,
the legislation must also preserve the accused's constitutional rights.
Balancing the competing interests of a child witness against those
of a defendant constitutes the challenge of this type of legislation.
This comment examines the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation versus a state's interest in protecting the well-being
of sexually abused children. The discussion will first examine the
case of Maryland v. Craig.14 Second, Coy v. Iowa,15 the seed of the
Craig16 decision, will be analyzed. Third, a detailed analysis will
discuss the Craig7 decision with an emphasis on its shortcomings
and its future effects.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
Sandra Ann Craig owned and operated Craig's County Pre-
School located in Howard County, Maryland.18 Brooke Etze at-
tended the school from August, 1984 through June 7, 1986.' 9 During
that period, Brooke Etze was between four and six years of age. 20
On June 21, 1986, Mr. and Mrs. Etze read a newspaper article
describing complaints of child abuse at Ms. Craig's school.2' Shortly
12. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative In-
novations, 98 H.aRv. L. REv. 806, 808 (1985).
13. Id.
14. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
15. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
16. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157.
17. Id.
18. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 255, 544 A.2d 784, 786 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (the
trial in this case proceeded only upon the indictment involving Brooke Etze. Ultimately, 13 separate
indictments were returned against Ms. Craig. Her son Jamal Craig was also charged in two other
indictments).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Etze contacted a sexual assault center and
arranged to have Brooke examined by a therapist.22
In later conversations with her parents and the therapist, Brooke
disclosed numerous incidents of physical, sexual, and psychological
abuse2 3 The incidents of abuse which Brooke described were com-
mitted by Ms. Craig, her two children, and other children in the
school.24 According to Brooke, Ms. Craig had kicked her legs and
her genitals, inserted objects in her vagina, and threatened her with
the loss of her parents' love. 25 These allegations were confirmed by
a medical exam conducted upon Brooke shortly after her parents
learned of the incidents .26
Following the physicians report, a six-count indictment against
Ms. Craig was returned in the circuit court of Howard County.
The indictment charged Ms. Craig with first degree sexual offense,
second degree sexual offense, child abuse, unnatural and perverted
sexual practice, common-law assault, and common-law battery.2
B. Posture
The State, in recognition of the childrens' inability to commu-
nicate, moved to allow Brooke and other young children to testify
through closed-circuit television in accordance with Maryland's
closed-circuit-child-testimony statute. 29 The State's motion was
granted.30
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 256, 544 A.2d at 786. Prior to trial a number of motions were filed. A motion in
limine to preclude testimony by the therapist as to statements made to her by Brooke constituted one
of the motions filed on Ms. Craig's behalf. Also, a motion for disclosure of impeaching information
and a motion for discovery and production of documents were also filed on Ms. Craig's behalf. Ms.
Craig's motion in limine was denied. In light of a formal response to a demand for particulars and
discovery motions, the parties agreed to an open-file discovery.
29. Section 9-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of
Maryland (1989) provides in full:
(a)(l) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article or
Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony of a child victim be
1064 [Vol. 93
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Ms. Craig was convicted on all six counts."' Ms. Craig's motions
for a new trial were denied on September 21, 1987.32 An appeal then
followed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. There the
court found no merit to any of the complaints and affirmed.3 Again,
Ms. Craig appealed and in July of 1989, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted a Writ of Certiorari.3 4 The Court of Appeals or-
dered the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed and
the case remanded in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Coy v. Iowa, which will be discussed later herein.3s
Finally, the State brought the case before the United States Su-
preme Court.36 The Supreme Court reversed the Maryland Court of
Appeals by a five-to-four majority. The Court upheld the consti-
taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit
television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceedings; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will rest in
the child suffering serious emotional distress that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the judge may ques-
tion the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to be unobtrusive.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when the child testifies
by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the opinion of the court,
contributes to the well-being of the child, including a person who has dealt with the child
in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge and the defendant
shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons in the
room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identification of a
defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant in the courtroom at the same
time.
MD. CTS. & Jtm. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1988).
30. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 256, 544 A.2d at 787.
31. Id. at 257, 544 A.2d at 787.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 258, 544 A.2d at 787.
34. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 556, 560 A.2d 1120, 1122 (1989).
35. Coy, 487 U.S. 1012.
36. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157.
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tutionality of Maryland's closed-circuit-child-testimony statute, which
allowed sexually abused children to testify through closed-circuit tel-
evision.37 The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor
and joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, and Kennedy.
C. Prior Law
Although the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment has
been the object of incessant litigation, the seed of Maryland v. Craig38
was Coy v. Iowa.39 In Coy, 40 the issue confronting the court was
whether an Iowa statute, 41 which permitted the placement of a one-
way screen between criminal defendants and child witnesses, violated
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 42 The Court, in
37. Id. at 3171.
38. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157.
39. Coy, 487 U.S. 1012.
40. Id.
41. The IowA CODE states:
1. A court may, upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, order that the tes-
timony of a child, as defined in section 702.5, be taken in a room other than the courtroom
and be televised by closed circuit equipment in the courtroom to be viewed by the court.
Only the judge, parties, counsel, persons necessary to operate the equipment, and any person
whose presence, in the opinion of the court, would contribute to the welfare and well-being
of the child may be present in the room with the child during the child's testimony.
2. The court may, upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, order that the testimony
of a child, as defined in section 702.5, be taken by recorded deposition for use at trial,
pursuant to rule of criminal procedure 12(2)(b). In addition to requiring that such testimony
be recorded by stenographic means, the court may on motion and hearing, and upon a
finding that the child is unavailable as provided in Iowa rules of evidence 804(a), order the
videotaping of the child's testimony for viewing in the courtroom by the court. The vid-
eotaping shall comply with the provisions of rule of criminal procedure 12(2)(b), and shall
be admissible as evidence in the trial of the cause.
3. The court may upon motion of a party admit into evidence the recorded statements
of a child, as defined in section 702.5, describing sexual contact performed with or on the
child, not otherwise admissible in evidence by statute or court rule if the court determines
that the recorded statements substantially comport with the requirements for admission
under Iowa rules of evidence 803(24) or 804(5).
A court may, upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, order the court testimony
of a child to be limited in duration in accordance with the developmental maturity of the
child. The court may consider or hear expert testimony in order to determine the appropriate
limitation on the duration of a child's testimony. However, the court shall, upon motion,
limit the duration of a child's uninterrupted testimony to one hour, at which time the court
shall allow the child to rest before continuing to testify.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1987).
42. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
[Vol. 931066
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a six-to-two decision, held that although not absolute, the Con-
frontation Clause does provide a criminal defendant the right to
face-to-face confrontation with witnesses testifying against him at
trial.43 Moreover, the Court held that the Iowa Screen Statute" vi-
olated the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation by al-
lowing child witnesses to avoid viewing the defendant. 4
In Coy,46 Justice Scalia clearly demonstrated his devotion for
face-to-face confrontation with arguments such as "[t]he perception
that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the cen-
turies because there is much truth to it." 47 Although Justice Scalia
declared that the "rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are
not absolute," 48 it is apparent throughout his opinion that he be-
lieves a defendant's right of face-to-face confrontation should always
outweigh any competing public interest. However, in determining
that Iowa's screening procedure denied the defendant his consti-
tutional right to face-to-face confrontation with complaining child
witnesses, Justice Scalia, writing for a base majority of four, pro-
laimed that the Court would leave for another day the question of
whether any exception exists to a defendant's constitutionally guar-
anteed right of face-to-face confrontation. 49
In Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Coy,5 0 she empha-
sized that nothing in this decision necessarily dooms similar efforts
by state legislatures to protect child witnesses.." In other words, there
may be an exception to the general requirement of face-to-face con-
frontation. Thus, Coy v. Iowa5 2 set the stage for Maryland v. Craig,53
the Supreme Court's most recent opinion considering the consti-
tutionality of a state's closed circuit child testimony statute. 4
43. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019.
44. See supra note 41.
45. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
46. 487 U.S. 1012.
47. Id. at 1019.
48. Id. at 1020.
49. Id. at 1021.
50. 487 U.S. 1012.
51. Id. at 1023.
52. 487 U.S. 1012.
53. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
54. See supra note 29.
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D. Majority Opinion
The majority in Maryland v. Craig5 reaffirmed a preference for
face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, but it
refused to hold that such action constitutes an indispensable element
of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's
accusers. In interpreting the Confrontation Clause, the majority be-
gan by looking at its past treatment of the constitutionally guar-
anteed right of confrontation. The majority observed that in the
past the court has recognized that the Confrontation Clause guar-
antees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact.56 However, the majority observed that in
past opinions the Court had suggested that an exception to the de-
fendant's right to confront witnesses against him would only be
allowed when consideration of public policy and the necessities of
the case demanded it. Justice O'Connor proclaimed that the Court's
present interpretation of the Confrontation Clause constitutes a de-
cision sensitive to its purpose and sensitive to the necessities of trial
and the adversary process. 8
The state's interest in the protection of child victims of sex crimes
from further trauma and embarrassment was recognized by the ma-
jority as a "compelling" interest.59 With little hesitation, the ma-
jority proclaimed that if the State makes an adequate showing of
necessity, then a witness may testify through closed-circuit television
without face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.6 0
In addition, the Court noted that a substantial state interest must
be determined by a case-specific determination. 61 Accordingly, a stat-
utory general finding of a substantial state interest will not withstand
constitutional attacks. More specifically, the majority expressed the
55. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
56. Id. at 3165.
57. Id. at 3162.
58. Id. at 3163.
59. Id. at 3169.
60. Id. at 3165.
61. Id. at 3167 (emphasis in original, Globel Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); Federal Communication Comm'n
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978)).
[Vol. 931068
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view that the trial court must hear evidence and determine whether
use of the one-way-closed-circuit television procedure is necessary
to protect the welfare of each particular child witness who seeks to
testify.6 2 Justice O'Connor further stated that the trial court must
also find that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the
courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant. 63 The
emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of
the defendant must be more than de minimis (more than mere nerv-
ousness or excitement or reluctance to testify) . 4
In applying this standard to the case before them, the majority
concluded that because the Maryland statute requires a determi-
nation that the child witness will suffer "serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate," 6 5 the statute
clearly suffices to meet the case specific standards. 66
Furthermore, the majority found error with the Court of Appeals
assertions that Maryland's child-closed-circuit-testimony statute can-
not be invoked unless the child witness initially is questioned in the
defendant's presence. 67 Additionally, the majority found error with
the Court of Appeals assertion that before using the one-way tel-
evision procedure, a trial judge must determine whether a child would
suffer "severe emotional distress" if he or she were to testify by
two-way-closed-circuit television.68 Following this finding of error,
Justice O'Connor proclaimed "[a]lthough we think such evidentiary
requirements would strengthen the grounds for use of protective
measures, we decline to establish as a matter of federal constitutional
law any such categorical evidentiary prerequisites for the use of the
one-way television procedures. "69
In sum, Justice O'Connor stated there was no dispute that the
child witness in this case testified under oath, was subject to full
62. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing MD. CTS. & JUr. PROC. CODE Ar. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii)).
67. See id. at 3170-71.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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cross-examination, and was able to be observed by the judge, jury,
and defendants as the child testified. Justice O'Connor concluded,
to the extent that a proper finding of necessity has made, the ad-
mission of such testimony would be consistent with the Confron-
tation Clause. 70 The majority then vacated and remanded the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion. 7'
E. Dissenting Opinion
From a reading of the dissenting opinion, it is clear that Justice
Scalia apparently believes that the purpose of enshrining the Con-
frontation Clause of the Constitution is to "assure that none of the
many policy interests from time to time persuaded by statutory law
could overcome a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in
court.' '72 It appears Justice Scalia believes the protection of sexually
abused children is such a current widespread position or policy in-
terest that should not be relied on by the majority to vary the literal,
unavoidable text of the Constitution's Confrontation Clause.
It is unmistakably clear that the dissent's view constitutes a strict
textual or tunnel-vision analysis. Through his opinion, Justice Scalia
refers to the irreducible literal meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 73
In doing so, the dissent characterized the Sixth Amendment's Con-
frontation Clause as unavoidable text which unqualifiedly guarantees
that the defendant should be confronted by witnesses who appear
at trial.74
When addressing the majority opinion, Justice Scalia relies on
analogies which he takes to great extremes in order to discredit the
majority's opinion. For instance, the dissent analogizes the major-
ity's statement that it "cannot say that face-to-face confrontation
... is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment," to the
legal absurdity of saying "we cannot say that being tried before a
70. Id. at 3171.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3174.
74. Id. at 3173.
1070 [Vol. 93
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jury is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of the right to a jury trial. ' 75 Similarly, the majority's conclusion
that unconfronted testimony may be admissible hearsay persuades
Justice Scalia to the unconstitutional analogy that "presumably there
are other categories of admissible hearsay consisting of unsworn
testimony when the witness is unable to undergo hostile question-
ing. ))76
Justice Scalia tries to further undermine the majority opinion by
using a means-ends analysis. By implying that the majority is only
concerned with the ends and not the means, Justice Scalia proclaims
that the majority's reasoning is wrong because the Confrontation
Clause does not guarantee an "end" such as reliable evidence. 77
Rather, the dissent argues that the Confrontation Clause guarantees
a "means." The means constitute specific trial procedures, such as
face-to-face confrontation, which were thought to assure reliable
evidence. 8 The dissent's literal interpretation concludes that "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him means always and eve-
rywhere." 79
Finally, the dissent ends its opinion where it began, questioning
the majority's interest-balancing analysis and the majority's au-
thority to judicially legislate where the text of the Constitution does
not permit such judicial legislation. 0
III. AiLYsis
The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment states that
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him."81 This constitu-
tional guarantee, known as the Confrontation Clause, appears to
grant the accused the right to face-to-face confrontation of witnesses
against him.
75. Id. at 3172.
76. Id. at 3174.
77. Id. at 3172.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3176.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1991] 1071
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At common law there was never any recognized right to an in-
dispensable thing called "confrontation" as distinguished from cross-
examination.12 As Dean Wigmore states, "it was the same thing
under the different names.''83 Moreover, Dean Wigmore asserts that
the primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to allow the
defendant to cross-examine his accusers, rather than for the idle
purpose of gazing upon the witness, or being gazed upon by the
witness. 4
The origins of the right to confront one's accusers are obscure.
However, many legal historians cite the 1603 treason trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh as the catalytic influence in the development of the
right to confront one's accusers.85 In his trial, Raleigh was convicted
primarily on the basis of a written confession of an alleged co-
conspirator who was not present at trial. 6
Prior to 1964, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause ap-
plied only to trials in federal courts. However, in Pointer v. Texas 7
the right of confrontation was applied to state action under a Four-
teenth Amendment due-process claim. Since that time, states have
independently begun to define this right through the passage of state
statutes.8 8 Although most state courts have upheld statutes which
82. 5 WIMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 1395-1401 (1974).
83. Id. at § 1397.
84. Id. at § 1395.
85. For a discussion of the Raleigh trial see F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States 104-05 (1951); Graham, The Right to Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir
Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Cau. L. BuLL. 99 (1972).
86. See Graham, supra note 85, at 100.
87. 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
88. See ArA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251 and 4253(B),
(C) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE ArN. § 1346 (West Supp. 1990);
CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413 and 18-6-401.3 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54- 86g (1989); DEL CODE
ANN., Tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT., ch. 626, Rule Evid. 616
(1985); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38 106A-2 (1989); IND. CODE §.35-37-4- 8(c), (d), (f), (g) (1988); IowA
CODE § 910A.14 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4)
(Baldwin Supp. 1989); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 278, § 16D (Supp. 1990); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 600.2163a(5) (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4) (1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1407
(Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 491.-675-491.690 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15401 to 46-
15-403 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227 (1989); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); Osno REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.41(a), (B), (D), (E) (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT., Tit. 22, § 753(C) (Supp. 1988); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 40.460 (24) (1989); 42 PA. CoNsT. STAT. § 5982, 5984 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13.2
1072 [Vol. 93
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allow for something less than face-to-face confrontation, 9 not all
courts have decided to uphold this type of state statute. 90 For in-
stance, in Missouri v. Davidson,9 the state court held that the ad-
mission of video tape depositions of child victims taken while the
defendant was excluded from the room violated the defendant's con-
stitutional confrontational rights.92 Therefore, due to the states lack
of uniformity in defining a defendant's right to confrontation, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Maryland v. Craig93 to resolve
the important Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause issues raised
by these types of cases.
After analyzing Coy v. Iowa, 94 it is apparent that Justice O'Con-
nor's concurring opinion in that case was the seed of the majority
opinion in Craig.95 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
stated, as she did in Coy, 96 that if a court makes a "case-specific
finding of necessity ... the structures of the Confrontation Clause
may give way to the compelling State interest of protecting child
witnesses." 97 Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Coy98 was similarly restated in the Craig dissent. 99
In the majority opinion in Maryland v. Craig,10° Justice O'Con-
nor addressed the real issue of the case which was the interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. She used a balancing
(Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE § 16-3-1530 (G) (1985); S.D. COD. LAws § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-7-116(d), (e), (f) (Supp. 1989), TEx. CaRm. PRoc. CODE ANN., Art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon
Supp. 1990); Utah Rule Crim. Proc. 15.5 (1990); Vt. Rule Evid. 807(d) (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT.
AN. § 967.04(7) to (10) (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. Stat § 7-11-408 (1987).
89. State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (1982); State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51,
554 A.2d 277 (1989); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
90. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 504 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Cooper,
291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987); State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986); State
v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. 1984).
91. 764 S.W.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1989).
92. Id. at 734.
93. 110 S. Ct. at 3162.
94. 487 U.S. 1012.
95. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
96. 487 U.S. 1012.
97. Coy, 487 U.S. 1025; Craig, S. Ct. at 3169.
98. 487 U.S. at 1014.
99. See generally, 110 S. Ct. at 3171.
100. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
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approach which balanced the interest of the state in protecting a
child witness' well-being against the criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. In analyzing the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause, Justice O'Connor divided her discussion
into three areas of concern. First, she avoided the literal meaning
of the Confrontation Clause. Second, she found an important state
interest. And third, she found the need for a case specific approach.
These three areas of concern will now be addressed separately.
A. Avoiding the Literal Meaning of the Sixth Amendment
Justice O'Connor proclaimed that the Supreme Court had never
held that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants
the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses who were
testifying against them at trial.0 1 Furthermore, she argued that such
a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause "would abrogate vir-
tually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended
and too extreme."'' 2 For example, if literal adherence to the Con-
frontation Clause was required, then, contrary to the established
precedent, the admission of dying declarations would not be per-
mitted. 10 3 Similarly, if literal adherence was required, then admissible
testimony of a witness who had previously testified and been cross-
examined but had died after the first trial, would become inad-
missible at a second trial. This is also contrary to the established
precedent.' 4
Rather, the nonliteral interpretation of the text of the Confron-
tation Clause which the majority adopted was consistent with other
Supreme Court holdings restricting Sixth Amendment rights. 0 For
example, precedent has established that the right to be present at
trial was not violated where the trial judge removed the defendant
101. Id. at 3163.
102. Id. at 3168.
103. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
104. Id. at 240-44.
105. Taylor v. United States, 484 U.S. 400, 410-16 (1988) (the right to compulsory process not
violated where trial judge precluded testimony of a surprise defense witness); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 51-54 (1987) (the right to cross- examination not violated where the State denied defendant
access to investigate files).
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for disruptive behavior.06 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held
that the right to the effective assistance of counsel is not violated
where the trial judge prevented the testifying defendant from con-
ferring with counsel during a short break in testimony.1 7 Conse-
quently, a purpose-oriented interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause reflects a reading consistent with prior interpretations of Sixth
Amendment rights by the Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor stated that "the central concern of the Con-
frontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against
a criminal defendant. 10 8 The Confrontation Clause has a functional
purpose which preserves the reliability of testimony. Therefore, if
there is another action which fulfills this reliability concern it will
step in the place of the Confrontation Clause. The implied elements
of the Confrontation Clause satisfy this functional purpose or cen-
tral concern by ensuring the reliability of evidence. As expressed by
Justice O'Connor, the implied elements of the Confrontation Clause
constitute: "physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and obser-
vation of demeanor by the trier of fact." 1 09 These four reliability
elements of confrontation "serve the purpose of the Confrontation
Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an accused is re-
liable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm
of Anglo-American criminal proceedings." 110 Moreover, observance
by the trier of fact of the witness being cross-examined, which re-
flects the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the
truth,' generally satisfies the objective of the Confrontation Clause.
The four reliability elements must be satisfied before a court can
refuse to allow criminal defendants to confront witnesses against
them.
One commentator argues that the rights of a defendant must
outweigh the welfare of a witness, even if the witness is a child,
because the very essence of our criminal system is the presumption
106. Illinois v. Alien, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
107. Perry v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272, 280-85 (1989).
108. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
1991] 1075
15
Neuman: A Child's Well Being v. A Defendant's Right to Confrontation
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
of innocence." According to supporters of the Craig dissent, the
right of confrontation constitutes the primary safeguard for the pre-
sumption of innocence. Supporters of Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion declare that to abridge the right of one group in favor of
the rights of another is not the answer.113 Justice O'Connor correctly
undermines such criticism by stating that "the law in its wisdom
declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed
in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the ac-
cused."114
B. Finding an Important State Interest
Due to the general agreement on the state's important interest
in cases involving sexually abused children, Justice O'Connor vir-
tually assumed, with little discussion, that an important state interest
was involved. Considering the number of sexually abused children
and the devastating effects of sexual abuse "it is evident beyond
the need for elaboration that the state's interest in safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.""'
Statutes enacted by a majority of states to protect child witnesses
from the trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases manifest
the widespread belief in the importance of such a public policy. 1 6
Consequently, Justice O'Connor's declaration that the protection of
child victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment
reflects a compelling state interest"7 is a widely held view in our
society.
Although Justice O'Connor stated that only an "important" state
interest must be found, she also frequently characterized the stan-
112. H. F. Salsbery, Brief of the Dissent Regarding the Proposed Amendments to the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence Relating to the Testimony of Child Victims and Witnesses 3 (1988). For
a discussion of abridgement of the presumption of innocence see Hochheiser v. Superior 'Court, 161
Cal. App. 3d 777, 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1984). See also Graham, Indicia of Reliability and
Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MiAmm L.
Rsv. 19, 74-75 (1985).
113. See supra note 112.
114. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3165.
115. Id. at 3167 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
116. Id.; see also Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022-23 (1988).
117. See id.
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dard as a "compelling" state interest instead. Throughout Justice
O'Connor's analysis she refers to the states' compelling interests in
child abuse cases." 8 Thus, although the holding only appears to re-
quire an important state interest, Justice O'Connor's use of a com-
pelling state interest clouds the clarity of the important state interest
requirement.
C. Using a Case Specific Approach
General statutory findings will apparently fail a constitutional
challenge. General statutory findings do not consider the specific
facts of each case, but instead make a finding applicable to all cases,
regardless of the circumstances. Thus, case specific findings are nec-
essary to the constitutional soundness of closed circuit child testi-
mony statutes. Case specific findings require the court in each case
to hear testimony and make findings based on the testimony they
heard.
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor declared that three require-
ments must be satisfied under the case-specific approach. First, the
trial court must hear evidence which establishes that the one-way-
closed-circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare
of the child witness." 9 Second, the trial court must find that the
child witness would be traumatized by the presence of the defendant,
and not by the courtroom generally. In other words, the state's
interest cannot be merely to protect the child witness from court-
room trauma generally. 20 If general trauma from the courtroom
itself was the only problem, then the defendant's right to confron-
tation could be fulfilled by permitting the child to testify in less
intimidating surroundings with the defendant present.'2' Third, the
trial court must find that the child would suffer more than de min-
imis emotional trauma if required to testify in the defendant's pres-
ence.'2 More specifically, the emotional distress suffered must be
118. Id.
119. Id. at 3169.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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"more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to
testify."' 23
In the future, states will have to provide evidence proving the
three above-mentioned requirements to the trial court in order to
justify the use of one-way-closed-circuit televised testimony. These
case specific requirements, which avoid a general statutory finding
of fact, will enhance the constitutional soundness of statutes which
restrict the right of confrontation.
D. Further Analysis
Although there is no precedent directly on point in this case, the
majority has properly extended what precedent exists. As stated pre-
viously, the majority followed previous cases which allowed the de-
fendant's right to face-to-face confrontation to be overcome by an
important state interest.'2 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's non-ab-
solute interpretation of the Sixth Amendment reflects analogous Su-
preme Court interpretations by the Court of other Sixth Amendment
rights.'1- The majority interpreted and applied prior case law in a
fair and consistent manner. The majority extended earlier decisions
which also avoided the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
There is no existing Supreme Court precedent regarding one-way
television taping procedures denying the defendant's right to face-
to-face confrontation. Overall, the majority opinion follows the
precedent set by the Supreme Court.
After analyzing the majority opinion, it is this writer's opinion
that the legal basis of Justice O'Connor's opinion rests on prior case
law which is speckled with moral overtones. Although Justice
O'Connor correctly interpreted Supreme Court precedent, this prec-
edent constitutes constitutional interpretations that also avoid the
literal text of the constitution due to reliance on moral beliefs.
As Justice Scalia notes, the Sixth Amendment's text of "the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
123. Id. (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d 275, 289, (1987)); see also
State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 511- 12, 57 P. 542, 543-44 (1899).
124. See id. at 3164, see supra note 105.
125. Id. at 3166, see supra note 106 & 107.
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against him' '1 26 constitutes a literal, unavoidable text'2 which un-
qualifiedly guarantees the defendant the right to be confronted by
witnesses who appear at trial against him. 28 An interpretation or
compromise of the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to
confrontation reflects judicial legislation where the "irreducible lit-
eral meaning of the Clause"' 29 does not allow such legislation. Thus,
the majority's moral judgement clouds the unmistakable clarity of
the Sixth Amendment. 30 It is clear that the majority believes that
the state interest in protecting sexually abused child witnesses from
further trauma should outweigh this constitutional guarantee. Con-
sidering the horrifying and rising child sexual abuse statistics, it is
hard to view such judicial interpretation as misplaced.
Although not expressed by Justice O'Connor, one possible reason
the Court upheld one-way-televised testimony may be the Court's
underlying desire to increase the number of successfully prosecuted
cases. By addressing and aiding a child's emotional needs, this type
of statute should increase the quantity, and, more importantly, the
quality of the testimony by each child witness. Consequently, an
increase in the successful prosecution rate would be a beneficial ram-
ification of this type of procedure. Thus, such a deterrence factor
may be an underlying reason behind the Court's decision.
Currently, of the thirty-seven states that have statutes which per-
mit the use of videotaped testimony of sexually abused children,'3
not one such statute meaningfully addresses technical aspects of tap-
ing procedures. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority also
failed to address these critical technical variables such as room light-
ing, camera angle, room temperature, etc. Without some meaningful
technical and procedural regulations, videotaped testimony could
have the same effect as watching television. Images can be distorted,
126. See supra note 42.
127. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3173.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3174.
130. Id. at 3171.
131. See supra note 88.
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the perspective can be limited, and most importantly the jury's eyes
become limited to the narrow view permitted by the camera.3 2
If meaningful regulations are not implemented by the states, then
a child's testimony could unjustifiably be credited or discredited by
a viewing jury because of external variables. For instance, if an
extremely hot and bright taping room causes a child witness to ap-
pear sweaty, uncomfortable, and shy to the camera's eye, the witness
may not be viewed as credible by the jury. Similar scenarios can
easily be imagined.
Additionally, a procedural regulation which declares that once
a child testifies, then both parties should be barred from calling the
child at trial is necessary. This type of regulation will limit the ex-
posure of the child to the harmful effects of testifying. More im-
portantly, it will prevent the jury from concluding that anything out
of the norm is happening and, thus, prevent any prejudicial con-
clusions from being drawn against either side. Moreover, videotaping
should not be allowed until the trial has begun.' A regulation of
this type prevents the prosecution from obtaining a powerful weapon
in plea bargaining and from having the luxury of planning trial
strategy based on the familararity of the recorded testimony of its
chief witness. 13 4 In order for such videotaping statutes to withstand
future constitutional challenges, meaningful technical quality and
procedural regulations must be implemented as part of the working
statutes.
In light of the large number of actions brought on the right to
confrontation, the Craig3s decision will have a significant impact.
The Craig36 decision appears to place a constitutional stamp of ap-
proval on statutes which allow the defendant's right for face-to-face
confrontation to be denied through one-way-closed-circuit-televised
testimony, at least in the context of child sexual abuse cases.
132. H. Salsbery, supra note 112, at 12.
133. Id.
134. See The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions, supra note 12, at 826-27.
135. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
136. Id.
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As long as the State demonstrates an important state interest,
the presence of the four reliability elements of confrontation, 137 and
the three requirements of a case specific finding, 138 similar statutes
will be upheld. But, as a result of Craig,39 branching or off-shoot
litigation appears to be just around the corner. First, challenges
relating to procedural and technical aspects of taping appear im-
minent. The court or legislature must specify taping procedure to
deal with variables such as room lighting, camera angle, room tem-
perature, etc. Second, other important public-policy interests are sure
to be brought to the court's attention as interests which should sim-
ilarly outweigh the defendant's right of face-to-face confrontation.
Cases involving other state interests, such as the protection of rape
victims, will be brought raising similar right to confrontation ques-
tions. Thus, although the court's decision should justifiably be relied
on in child sexual abuse cases, future litigation is on the horizon.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Craig'4° decision as a whole, reflects moralistic reasoning
which is in-tune with the present and future needs of society. The
Court kept the central issue of balancing a child's emotional well-
being against a defendant's right to confrontation foremost in its
decision. In Craig,14' the majority of the Supreme Court decided
that the time had come to curtail the overreaching of the defendant's
right to confrontation. The Court curtailed this right by holding
that the defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation is not an
absolute right, but is a right which may be defeated by an important
public policy. The majority's upholding of Maryland's closed-circuit-
child-testimony statute reflects the belief that protecting the well-
being of a sexually abused child witness is just such an important
public policy.
Finally, the Craig42 decision should pave the way for state leg-
islatures to enact similar child testimony statutes. Therefore, the time
137. See supra notes 109 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
139. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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has come for the West Virginia legislature to join the majority of
other states and enact a similar child-testimony statute. In enacting
such a statute, West Virginia should consider specific technical tap-
ing requirements in order to avoid future problems. However, the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed what specific technical taping
requirements will be adequate under the Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause.
Todd H. Neuman
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